Several Virtual Private Networks are based on IPsec. However, IPsec has not been designed with elasticity in mind, which makes clusters of IPsec security gateways hard to manage for providing high Service Level Agreement (SLA). Thus, these SG clusters need management techniques to maintain their Quality of Service. For example, ISPs use VPNs to secure millions of communications when offloading End-Users from Radio Access Networks towards alternative access networks such as WLANs. Additionally, Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) providers also handle thousands of VPN connections when remote EUs access private clouds services. This paper describes how to provide Traffic Management (TM) and High Availability (HA) for VPN infrastructures by sharing or transferring an IPsec session. TM and HA have been implemented and evaluated over a 2-nodes cluster. We measured their impact on a real time audio streaming simulating a phone conversation. We found out that over a 2 minutes conversation, the impact on QoS measured with POLQA while applying TM or HA, is less than 3%.
INTRODUCTION
VPN Security Entry Points are usually provided by one SG (Security Gateway) or two SGs for redundancy purposes. Such VPN architectures do not require Traffic Management (TM) mechanisms. Similarly, High Availability (HA) mechanisms can be performed either by re-establishing a session with the other Security Gateway, or by using HA mechanisms like ClusterIP, which enables transparent failover. This paper considers large VPN infrastructures with high SLA (Service Level Agreement) that cannot be provided by one or two Security Gateways. This VPN infrastructure requires the load to be distributed among multiple SGs in order to deal with up to millions of simultaneous VPN sessions. Additionally, such topology requires to be highly scalable, which means nodes within a cluster should be added when resources are required at anytime. We introduce TM to make possible the transfer of a VPN handled by an overloaded node to a newly added node, and thus increasing or decreasing their load. Then, we introduce HA to provide failover capacities. When a node fails, its traffic is automatically taken in charge by another node, as seamless as possible for EUs.
The mechanisms TM and HA address two scenarios: offload and virtual private cloud. Offload: as the aggregate smart-phone traffic in 2017 will be 19 times greater than it is today [3] , operators are offloading their End-Users (EUs) from Radio Access Networks (RANs) to some alternate access network technology (E.g. WLAN). EUs must maintain the same security level prior to the offload. This is why the EUs are setting up VPNs towards the core network of the ISP. As a result, the ISPs have to deal with millions of VPNs which are handled by clusters of security gateways, whose management might require TM and HA mechanisms. Virtual Private Cloud (VPC): network infrastructures of small and medium-size enterprises and individuals can be outsourced in the cloud. VPNs are often used by EUs to access their home's network or companies' in a secure manner. These infrastructures must be able to handle thousands VPN sessions at day time including rush hours. Thus, providers must ensure scalability and high SLA to its clients, and TM and HA features are required. IPsec was originally not designed for dynamic and clustered environments. Indeed, an IPsec session is intended to remain installed in the same device during a session. New services has brought new requirements like mobility, multihoming, handover, TM and HA. This paper describes TM and HA, two mechanisms allowing IPsec session management among different SGs in a seamless way. Unlike mobility or multihoming, TM and HA both involve transferring an IPsec session among SGs. This operation remains transparent to the EU because both SGs share an unique IP address. The key elements for TM and HA are to define an IPsec context and synchronize the counters associated to an IPsec session, avoiding longer interruption while transferring a VPN session.
Throughout this paper, section 2 introduces some related work concerning IPsec facing mobility, context transfer and failover. Section 3 defines the two mechanisms intended to provide TM and HA for IPsec SGs. Following section 4, introduces the constraints of transferring an IPsec context between different nodes. Then, section 6 shows our experimental results with real implementation testbeds. Finally, conclusions and future works are given in section 7.
RELATED WORK
MOBIKE [5] is a mobility and multihoming extension for IKEv2 (Internet Key Exchange protocol). Mobility makes possible updating the IP addresses associated to an IPsec session. Even though MOBIKE is not used nor implemented throughout this investigation, it might be useful for future work whenever setting cluster with different IP addresses. Georgiades et al. in [6] exposed a theoretical case of study for homogeneous and heterogeneous security context transfer, avoiding renegotiation of all the IPsec parameters from scratch. The paper discusses how a security context can be associated to an EU profile in RADIUS, Diameter . Allard et al. in [1] already addressed the transfer of an IKE/IPsec context. It proposes a MOBIKE extension in order to avoid collision of SA. For this matter, all the parameters for both IKEv1/IPsec and IKEv2/IPsec contexts are well identified. However, the motivation to perform a security context transfer was to make mobility in a Mobile IP environment faster. TM and HA differ from mobility, as the transfer is initiated by the EU and thus removes IPsec counter synchronization constraints (refer to section 4).
ARCHITECTURE DEFINITION
This section introduces TM and HA mechanisms. Figure 1a illustrates the VPC topology principle. EUs placed within an UNTRUSTED zone first establish a VPN with the cluster of SGs to access services in the TRUSTED zone. All the cluster members are configured under a single IP address, however only one node can be responsible of a single session. The load distribution among the cluster members is out of the scope of this paper. Our proposal concentrates in providing elasticity to IPsec session so they can be transferred among different SGs. Providers interested in managing their VPN traffic within a cluster of SGs can use TM to balance the load among different nodes. For example, in the case where one specific SG is overloaded, the TM mechanism can transfer VPN sessions from the overloaded SG to other nodes within the cluster, avoiding failures due to overloaded SGs and improving QoS. As in figure 1b, , TM offers the possibility to move the tunnel from one SG to another within the cluster. All the information concerning this session must also be transferred: the cryptographic material, IDs, traffic selectors, timers and counters associated. The main advantage of transferring IPsec information is to prevent the EU to re-establish a new VPN from scratch, reducing interruption to some unnoticeable event. Indeed, our results show that it has minimal impact on QoS. Note that the security model remains valid as the SGs have a trusted relation between each other. Figure 1c shows the HA mechanism. VPC providers interested in providing failover capabilites, implement HA in order to ensure connectivity even in the case of failures. In contrast to TM, failover is performed only when a failure occurs, whereas TM can be launched at any particular time. The HA mechanism is capable to detect when one memeber is down at any moment. Is is also capable to take decisions about the distribution of the affected VPN sessions among the remaining cluster members. To achieve this, HA includes two functions: Heartbeat and Sync. TheSync function periodically maintains the VPN session parameters synchronized among all cluster members, whereas the Heartbeat frequently checks aliveness of nodes and alert if a failure occurs. Whenever one SG fails, an alternate SG becomes responsible for the affected VPN sessions. Similarly to our TM architecture, there is a risk that VPN session counters (Messages IDs and sequence numbers) become desynchronized. How to overcome this issue is explained in detail in section 4.
Traffic Management Mechanism

High Availability Mechanism
CONTEXT TRANSFER CONSTRAINTS
When establishing a VPN, EUs first set up a secure signaling channel through the IKEv2 protocol. This secure channel is set up through the IKEv2 Security Associations (IKE SAs), allowing encrypted and authenticated message exchange. It is only used for control and signaling purposes. Nodes actually use the IKEv2 signaling channel to negotiate their IPsec Security Associations (IPsec SAs), which cipher and authenticate the flow between both nodes. Once the Security Associations are established, the IKE SAs are maintained at the application layer while the IPsec SAs are mostly configured in the kernel space. Note that IPsec SAs have an associated counter called sequence number, which are increased whenever an incoming/outgoing IP packet is protected with it respective SA. Duplicated usage of a sequence number is forbidden, providing anti-replay protection to data flow. These counters and all the cryptographic material are store within the kernel. However, most IKEv2 applications store the static IPsec SA information (algorithms, IP addresses, etc.), while the dynamic IPsec data is maintained only in the kernel (sequence numbers, bytes counting, etc.). Finally, when transferring a VPN session from one SG to another requires to transmit static information as well as dynamic information maintained in the kernel. Keeping this information up to date 
IKE_SAs constraints
Challenges and solutions concerning the IKE SA when implementing TM and HA are: Stale Value of Message ID: during a VPN context transfer, it is possible that the newly responsible SG is not aware of the last IKE response sent by the cluster. If this ever happens, the message IDs used by the new responsible SG are stale. Actually, an IKE SA needs to update its message IDs very often, because processing an exchange with higher ID value is not allowed. This is achieved by synchronizing the message ID counters very frequently or even immediately after each signaling exchange. Unacknowledged Request: it may happen that the new responsible SG is unaware of the last IKE request received within the cluster, thus the counters are stale. Receiving an unexpected message ID response would result in discarding the packet, leading to IKE SAs destruction. The only way to reduce this risk, is to synchronize the message IDs after each exchange, however there is no possible way to completely remove this possibility. Although there are new standards that allow renegotiation of counters (i.e. RFC6311 in [10] ), this would impact the EU's experience in terms of number of exchanges and delays to reestablish the session.
IPsec_SAs constraints
Challenges and solutions concerning the IPsec SA when implementing TM and HA is basically the Stale Sequence Number value. Whenever a SG takes responsibility for a given active VPN session, it may happen that the sequence numbers are out of date. This occurs when the newly responsible SG starts sending IPsec protected packets with stale sequence number packets. The IPsec's anti-replay mechanism rejects any duplicated sequence number value. In our case the antireplay mechanisms makes the EU discard all incoming IPsec packets. However, the IPsec standard allows to increase the value of sequence numbers at any time, even without preventing the EUs. Thus, the communication remains uninterrupted. Nevertheless, sequence numbers are stored in the kernel of the system and thus change very quick. It is necessary to use kernel libraries that involve modification of such counters when updating these values. figure 2a while HA testbed is represented in figure 2b
TESTBED DESCRIPTION
Performance Measurements
The consider an EU establishing a VPN towards the VPC cluster (composed of two SGs), securing the access to the audio streaming placed behind the cluster. Intially, SG1 is always responsible of incoming connections. Then, the EU receives an audio streaming with a duration of 8sec. Our performance tests are conducted either with HA or TM:
-HA tests: in the HA scenario, the Heartbeat and Sync functions take place every second. It means that, during an active VPN session, SG2 maintains synchronization of IKE SAs and IPsec SAs every second, and also detects whether SG1 is still responding. During the audio streaming of 8sec, we caused a failure in SG1. The Heartbeat function on SG2 makes detection and installs the VPN session that is previously synchronized through the Sync function. When the IKE SAs and IPsec SAs are installed on SG2, the VPN session is thus transferred towards SG2, becoming the new responsible entry point for the affected EU.
-TM tests: in the TM scenario, our test consists in transferring a VPN session from SG1 to SG2 during the audio streaming of 8sec. In contrast with HA, there is no failure in SG1 nor detection of interruption by SG2. During TM tests, we only perform a transfer of a VPN session and we measure the impact over the audio streaming. We considered different parameters during our tests: -RTSP vs. HTTP: we used two protocols for the audio streaming transmission, RTSP and HTTP. RTSP stands for Real Time Streaming Protocol, whereas HTTP stands for Hypertext Transfer Protocol. RTSP is based on UDP whereas HTTP is based on TCP.
-CBC vs. CTR: in terms of encryption, we test two different encryption algorithms, AES128-CBC and AES128-CTR.
-Bit-Rates: we used three different bit-rates 8Kbps, 48Kbps and 96Kbps for each scenario.
-POLQA: we use POLQA (see [9] ) to measure QoS impact. It requires a 8sec audio sample when performing evaluation of QoS. This is why we performed audio streaming with audio files of this length. POLQA note QoS from 1 (worst quality) to 5 (best quality).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents experimental measurements for TM ( fig. 3a and 3b) and HA ( fig. 3c and 3d ). The impacts of both TM and HA is the result of measuring network and QoS aspects. Network aspects consist in measuring how long a single communication is interrupted, whereas QoS aspects consists in measuring through POLQA how the QoS of an audio streaming service is impacted.
Traffic Management results
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the total interruption time and the impact over QoS respectively. Figure 3b depicts how the audio streaming quality is downgraded when performing TM. As RSTP streaming has a smaller network interruption time than HTTP, POLQA calculated a reduction of the QoS by 35% for an HTTP-based streaming and 27.5% for RTSP. Because RTSP runs over UDP, no retransmission of packets is done when losing packets, resulting in a quicker reestablishment of the VPN session (see fig 3a) . The 8Kbps bit-rate is not taken into account due to its bad quality transmissions and further bad qualifications. On the other hand, there is almost no difference between different bit-rates or between different encryption methods (CBC or CTR). Melo et al. studied in [4] the duration distribution of more than one billion phone calls during the year 2010. The average time for a phone call resulted in 2min. In a scenario like this, even if the impacts of our testbed are considerably high for an audio streaming with a duration of 8sec, these evaluations are not representative for real phone call durations like in [4] . Indeed, considering a 2min phone call length, the impact on the QoS becomes 2.33% and 1.83% for HTTP and RTSP respectively.
High Availability results
Figures 3c and 3d show the total interruption times and the impact over QoS for the HA testbed. In figure 3d , POLQA estimates 38% QoS loss for HTTP audio streamings and 29.75% for RTSP streaming. As for TM, 8Kbps registered the worst quality, and it was not possible to measure the impact for this particular bit-rate. The QoS is more impacted during HA than TM. Actually, HA takes more time to reestablish a VPN session due to its Heartbeat function, which adds an additional delay. Figure 3c shows that HTTP audio streaming is interrupted 2.37sec (on average). However, some of the measures resulted in more than 5sec to get reestablished, due to TCP window retransmissions when packet loss happened. In addition, the Heartbeat module introduces delays for VPN reestablishment. In some cases, the SG2 can take up to one second to realize that SG1 is not responding. Once detected, SG2 installs the previously synchronized session, becoming the new responsible SG. The audio streaming is interrupted on average 1.51sec, and RTSP shows better performance than HTTP. The main reason why RTSP performs better is its UDP-based transmission, which does not require packets retransmission. Finally, estimation of the impact on the QoS should be considered for audio length longer than 8sec. As in section 6.1, Melo et al. showed in [4] that average phone calls have duration of 2min. The impact on a 2min phone call is 2.53% for HTTP and 1.91% for RTSP.
HA vs. TM comparison
Besides HA results, it is noticeable that TM has better performance than HA. This is due to the Heartbeat function additional delay. Actually, TM does not include failure detection through a Heartbeat, whereas HA topologies do. This detection can take up to one second when the Heartbeat is set to this value. Reducing the Heartbeat frequency might improve the HA overall results, however, for developments reasons, we can not reduce the Heartbeat beyond this value.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a mechanism that provides elasticity and increases reliability for IPsec-based Virtual Private Clouds. Traffic Management (TM) and High Availability (HA) mechanisms ensure the continuity of a VPN service within a same Our results in terms of QoS, demonstrate that the impact of these mechanisms over a 8sec audio streaming are 35% (HTTP) and 27.5% (UDP) for TM and 38% (HTTP) and 29.75% (UDP) for HA. However, considering a phone call of 2min length, the impact is less than 3%. Future works include the study of TM and HA between different administrative domains, where the transfer of VPN sessions occurs among SGs owning different IP addresses. A prototype using a mobility extension of IKEv2 called MO-BIKE has been designed, and there are some ongoing developments. We also estimate that further investigations should consider designing an algorithm that distributes the load on clusters composed by more than 2 nodes.
